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BEARING THE ECONOMIC LOSS OF 
INDUSTRIAL ACTION: THE PAYMENT OF 
STRIKING EMPLOYEES UNDER THE FAIR 
WORK ACT 2009 (CTH)  
KAREN WHEELWRIGHT∗ 
This article aims to elucidate the legal principles governing the right of 
striking employees in Australia to payment during periods of industrial 
action. It explains briefly the common law antecedents to the strike pay 
provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and discusses in detail a 
number of decisions that interpret those provisions, including the recent 
High Court decision in CFMEU v Mammoet, which held that the 
prohibition on payments to employees who take protected industrial action 
is confined to the withholding of wages and does not permit employers to 
withhold other benefits, such as employer-sponsored accommodation. The 
article argues that, whilst the High Court decision provides a welcome 
clarification, there is a need for further judicial clarification of the partial 
work ban provisions in particular. The article discusses the assertions that 
the Fair Work Act provisions are overly prescriptive and the reasons for 
this, and suggests that they are unlikely to be relaxed in the current political 
climate.  
I INTRODUCTION 
The right to strike has long been recognised in international law as a 
fundamental right of all workers, although it is only since 1994 that Australian 
employees have had a statutory right to take industrial action, as part of the 
negotiations for enterprise agreements.1 Unions and their members generally 
                                                 
∗ BA, Grad Dip Ed; LLB (Hons); PhD, Faculty of Law, Monash University. The author wishes 
to thank the anonymous referee for helpful comments on a draft of this article.   
1 See, eg, International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, opened for 
signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) art 8.1(d). 
Whilst none of the conventions of the International Labour Organization (‘ILO’) expressly 
provide for the right to strike, ILO jurisprudence has established that such a right is implied in 
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do not take industrial action lightly, not least because employees must 
generally forgo their wages during periods of industrial action.2 This principle 
that employees who take industrial action are not entitled to be paid appears to 
be a simple and easily justified one. The provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 
(Cth) (‘FWA’) that deal with this issue, however, are not as straightforward in 
their application or, at least until very recently, as clear in their meaning as 
one might expect.  
This article seeks to explain the development of the ‘strike pay’3 provisions 
and the common law background, to analyse the ways in which recent 
litigation has clarified the strike pay provisions of the FWA, and to draw some 
conclusions about the fairness of the provisions in the light of these decisions. 
It is argued that, whilst the provisions are unnecessarily complex and detailed, 
they manage to strike a reasonable balance between the interests of employees 
and employers, particularly given the favourable interpretation of a key 
provision by the High Court in CFMEU v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd.4 The 
nature and scope of the provisions do, however, reflect some of the broader 
concerns that have been expressed about collective regulation under the FWA 
more generally. 
Part II sets out the common law principles of the work-wages bargain which 
are the antecedents of the statutory provisions in the federal legislation. 
Part III explains briefly the development of the right to strike in Australia, and 
of the statutory provisions and their purpose, as well as the definition of 
‘industrial action’ in the FWA. Part IV considers two issues of interpretation 
of the FWA provisions: first, which ‘payments to employee’ are actually 
prohibited by the legislation, focusing on the recent decision in Mammoet; 
and, secondly, how the provisions governing payments in cases of partial 
work bans are being interpreted under the FWA.  
                                                                                                                    
key conventions such as the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 
(entered into force 18 July 1951). The right to strike was introduced into federal law by the 
Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth), effective 30 March 1994. See generally Breen 
Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (The Federation Press, 5th ed, 2010) [22.1] and 
[23.03]–[23.04]. 
2 Where part of the work is performed, employees may be entitled to part of their wages — see 
Part II, Section B below. 
3 ‘Strike pay’ is defined as payments by an employer to make up in whole or in part wages not 
earned by the employee during a period of industrial action: see Construction, Forestry, 
Mining and Energy Union [CFMEU] v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd (2013) 300 ALR 460, 
[52] (‘Mammoet’). The expression is used as a short hand reference for the prohibition in 
s 470(1) of the FWA, although as the following discussion shows, the exact meaning of 
s 470(1) has been unclear until very recently. 
4 (2013) 300 ALR 460. 
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II THE COMMON LAW BACKGROUND 
A The Work-Wages Bargain 
At common law, the work-wages bargain is at the centre of the contract of 
employment. The employee provides his or her personal labour under the 
direction of the employer in exchange for the payment of the prescribed or 
agreed wages or salary. It follows from this that the employer is not required 
to pay wages unless the employee has performed the work lawfully required 
by the employer under the contract — the ‘no work-no pay’ principle.5 In the 
modern era of labour regulation, however, the no work-no pay principle is 
subject to numerous exceptions. For example, the National Employment 
Standards (NES) in the FWA entitle many employees to be paid their wages 
whilst on personal leave, compassionate leave, annual leave, or long-service 
leave.6  
In some circumstances, the employee may fulfil his or her part of the work-
wages bargain by being ‘ready and willing’ to perform work as directed, even 
if no work is actually done, such as by being ‘on call’.7 Alternatively, 
employees may be ready and willing to work but the employer may have no 
work for them to do, for example due to a strike at the employer’s supplier. 
Whilst at common law the employer would be entitled not to pay in such 
circumstances, this principle is often overridden by stand down clauses in 
enterprise agreements, which may require the employer to allocate the 
employee other suitable duties, or to allow the employee to take paid annual 
leave rather than forgo wages altogether.8 Employees who are locked out by 
their employer as part of an industrial campaign are not entitled to be paid, no 
matter how ready and willing they may be to perform their duties under their 
contracts.9  
                                                 
5 Automatic Fire Sprinklers v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435; Miles v Wakefield Metropolitan 
District Council [1987] AC 539. 
6 FWA pt 2-2. The NES minimum standards may be improved upon by enterprise agreements 
and contracts. 
7 However, an employee who has been dismissed by the employer, even if wrongfully, is never 
entitled to be paid, however ‘ready and willing’ they may be to perform the contract and even 
though the employee can, in theory, elect to treat the contract as being still on foot: see 
Automatic Fire Sprinklers v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435; Vissher v Giudice (2009) 239 CLR 
361. 
8 See FWA pt 3-5, which applies in the absence of provisions on stand down in an employee’s 
contract or enterprise agreement.  
9 Section 418 of the FWA provides than an employer ‘may not’ pay employees whom the 
employer has locked out in response to the employees’ industrial action.  
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The most common reason for an employer’s refusal to pay under the work-
wages bargain is because the employee is ‘on strike’. At common law, a 
refusal by employees to work for the purpose of disrupting the employer’s 
business (as a strategy to persuade the employer to listen to the employees’ 
industrial claims) is a repudiatory breach of contract, entitling the employer to 
dismiss without notice. A strike is not only a breach of the work-wages 
bargain, but also breaches the employee’s duties of fidelity and co-operation 
that are implied in all contracts of employment.10 Occasionally, the courts 
have held that legitimate industrial action merely suspends the contract of 
employment, rather than breaching it.11 
The common law principle that a strike is a fundamental breach of contract 
conflicts with the right to strike recognised in international law.12 Many 
western governments, including Australia’s, have introduced legislation to 
provide that, in defined circumstances, strike action is lawful13 and such 
legislation also provides protections for employees against dismissal or other 
adverse action by employers in response to lawful strike action.14 These 
provisions, however, do not alter the common law rule that employees who 
are on strike are not entitled to be paid.15  
B The Work-Wages Bargain and Partial Work Bans  
The common law principles are less certain in their application in cases where 
the industrial action consists of a refusal to perform part of the duties of the 
position, or where the duties are performed differently from the way they are 
customarily performed, for example by way of a ‘go slow’ or a ‘work to 
rule’.16 The starting point is that an employer does not have to accept less than 
the work contracted for. Provided that the employer is entitled contractually to 
order the employee to perform the full range of duties, then failure by the 
employee to perform all of those duties will disentitle the employee to be paid 
                                                 
10 See, eg, Secretary of State for Employment v ASLEF (No 2) [1972] 2 All ER 949. The fact 
that in practice most employers choose not to dismiss their striking workers does not detract 
from the right to do so. 
11 Morgan v Fry [1968] 2 QB 710.  
12 Above n 1. 
13 See FWA pt 3-3 div 1. 
14 See in particular FWA ss 340–2. 
15 See below Part IV for a detailed discussion of the strike pay provisions of the FWA. 
16 A work to rule campaign involves carrying out the duties of the position strictly according to 
a detailed rule book or written policy, which usually has the effect of less work than usual 
being performed. For an example, see Secretary of State for Employment v ASLEF (No 2) 
[1972] 2 All ER 949.  
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at all.17 For example, in the Unilever case, employees were held not to be 
entitled to their wages for being ready and willing to perform their usual 
duties on the factory floor whilst ignoring a lawful and reasonable order to 
attend a supervisors’ meeting.18  
Since it will usually be unfair for the employer to take the benefit of part-
performance whilst refusing to pay the employees any wages, the employer 
must make it clear to employees in advance that payment of wages depends 
on performance of all required duties. The Australian case law before the 
introduction of statutory provisions governing this issue suggests that the 
safest approach for employers was to refuse any performance of the contract 
that fell short of full performance of all duties, if they intended not to pay any 
wages. Employers who acquiesced in their employees’ performance of only 
part of their duties after instructing those employees to perform all duties 
could still be liable to make payment, particularly where the court determined 
that there had been substantial performance of the contract.19 However, 
proving substantial performance when partial work bans were in place was 
not always easy. Whether the banned work was insubstantial was not 
determined just by the amount of time usually devoted to it, but also involved 
consideration of the importance of the unperformed work to the employer. In 
Csomore v Public Service Board (NSW),20 the court reasoned that the 
unperformed work (the processing of payments received by the government) 
took on a significance beyond the proportion of duties that it represented in 
terms of time spent, because the refusal deprived the government of the 
revenue it needed to go about its business. This outcome reflects the reality 
that unions engaged in partial work bans will generally require their members 
to refuse such duties as will be sufficient to bring the employer to the 
bargaining table; otherwise, there is hardly any point to the ban.  
                                                 
17 Miles v Wakefield Metropolitan District Council [1987] AC 539, 561. 
18 See Unilever Australia Ltd v Food Preservers Union (1992) 45 IR 12. The refusal to attend 
supervisors’ meetings was part of an industrial campaign for improved annual leave 
entitlements. The employer cut the power to the process line when employees refused to 
attend the meeting as requested. 
19 Gapes v Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd (1980) 41 FLR 27. 
20 (1987) 10 NSWLR 587. The employees in that case were therefore not entitled to any pay 
because there had been no ‘substantial performance’ of their duties. 
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III THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON 
STRIKE PAY 
A The Right to Strike in Australia 
The statutory provisions on strike pay need to be understood against the 
background of the right to strike in Australian labour law. In spite of Australia 
being a signatory to key international labour standards supporting workers’ 
right to strike, there was no general right to strike in Australia until 1993. 
Strikes were generally illegal and the law provided significant sanctions 
against both striking individuals and their unions, including a wide range of 
tort actions.21 One of the reasons why the drafters of the Commonwealth 
Constitution gave the Commonwealth Parliament the power in 
section 51(xxxv) to make laws to settle disputes by conciliation and 
arbitration was that there had been such extensive and damaging industrial 
disputation in the colonies during the 1890s. The availability of conciliation 
and arbitration to deal with industrial disputes was intended specifically to 
‘replace the rude and barbarous process of strike and lockout’.22 Strikes were 
nevertheless more prevalent in Australia until the late 20th century than they 
were in other OECD countries.23  
The 1993 reforms introduced provisions enabling employers and employees 
to make collective bargaining agreements (called ‘certified agreements’) at 
the federal level as an alternative to having the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (‘AIRC’) settle industrial disputes about terms and conditions by 
making industrial awards. Consistent with collective bargaining regimes in 
Canada and the United States (‘US’), the new laws on collective agreement-
making provided for recourse to industrial action without fear of legal suit 
(called ‘protected industrial action’) to advance claims when an agreement 
could not be reached by bargaining alone.  
During the period of the Howard coalition government, the Workplace 
Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (‘WRA’) fostered both collective and individual 
agreement-making at the workplace level and continued to provide for 
industrial action to be lawful in narrowly defined circumstances, and for 
‘strike pay’ to be banned. The amendments introduced by the Workplace 
Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Bill 2005 (Cth) (‘Work Choices’) 
                                                 
21 Creighton and Stewart, above n 1, ch 22. Some state laws provided limited protection from 
tort action, but this was intermittent and patchy: see Shae McCrystal, The Right to Strike in 
Australia (The Federation Press, 2010) ch 3.  
22 H B Higgins, ‘A New Province of Law and Order’ (1915) 29 Harvard Law Review 13, 14. 
23 Creighton and Stewart, above n 1, [22.10]. 
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imposed new secret ballot requirements on unions before lawful strike action 
could be taken. Most of the WRA provisions remained when the Rudd Labor 
government replaced the WRA with the FWA, most of which commenced 
operation on 1 July 2009. 
B Strike Pay and Federal Industrial Legislation 
The no work-no pay principle had no express legislative form until the WRA 
was introduced, but provisions addressing disputes over strike pay appeared 
from 1979. In that year, the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) was 
amended to prevent the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission from making an award or order, or taking any other action in 
response to a claim for payment by employees involved in industrial action.24 
This provision made clear that claims for strike pay, whereby workers who 
lost pay due an industrial dispute, and who took further industrial action to 
force payment from the employer, could not be dealt with by the 
Commission.25 A provision with similar effect appeared in the Industrial 
Relations Act 1988 (Cth), which operated from 1 March 1989 until 30 
December 1996.26  
Since 1997, the federal legislation has had specific and very detailed 
provisions that make it unlawful for employees or unions to demand payment 
for periods when they are engaged in industrial action, and for employers to 
pay strike pay, irrespective of whether the industrial action is protected or not. 
From 1 January 1997, section 187AA(1) of the WRA provided that ‘an 
employer must not make a payment to an employee in relation to a period 
during which the employee engaged or engages in industrial action’. 
Contravention of the provision exposes employees, employers and unions to a 
range of penalties. 
The strike pay provisions were amended in 2005 by the Work Choices 
legislation. From 27 March 2006 until 30 June 2009, the WRA required 
employers to deduct a minimum of four hours’ pay for any period of 
industrial action, even if the industrial action was for a duration of less than 
four hours and even if it took the form of a partial work ban under which 
employees performed some of their duties.27 As McCrystal has observed, the 
effect of these provisions was to expose employers to penalties for paying 
                                                 
24 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 25A. 
25 This was common in the building and construction industry: see Creighton and Stewart, 
above n 1, [22.66]. 
26 Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) s 124; see Mammoet (2013) 300 ALR 460, [52]. 
27 WRA s 507(4), as amended by the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 
(Cth). 
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their employees for work the employees actually performed.28 This four-hour 
rule has been retained in the FWA, but applies now only to periods of 
unlawful industrial action. Presumably these ‘minimum deduction’ provisions 
seek to dissuade employees and their unions from imposing stoppages over 
trivial matters, although unions may be inclined to urge members to impose 
longer stoppages than they otherwise would if employees are to be docked a 
minimum of four hours’ pay.29  
1 The Meaning of ‘Industrial Action’ 
The federal legislation contains a detailed definition of industrial action and 
the employees’ actions must fall within the definition before the strike pay 
provisions will apply. ‘Industrial action’ is defined extensively in section 19 
of the FWA and the definition is largely consistent with definitions in the 
WRA. ‘Industrial action’ includes a complete withdrawal of labour,30 the 
performance of work by an employee in a manner different from that in which 
it is customarily performed, or restrictions or limitations on, or a delay in, the 
performance of the work.31 Industrial action also includes the lockout of 
employees from their employment by their employer.32  
In The Age Company Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, 
Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services,33 the AIRC expressed the 
view that action is not industrial in character if it stands completely outside 
the area of disputation and bargaining. The AIRC considered that the 
definition should be read giving some weight to the word ‘industrial’, but 
precisely how far this qualification might extend is a question of degree: ‘An 
employee who does not attend for work on account of illness may not be 
engaging in industrial action, while an employee who does not attend for 
work in support of a collective demand that the employer agree to alteration 
of the conditions of employment clearly is so engaged.’34  
A good example of the need for action to be ‘industrial’ in character is 
provided by CFMEU v Coal & Allied Mining Service Pty Ltd.35 In that case, 
the employer had required employees to submit urine samples for drug 
testing. The employees objected on the grounds that accurate saliva testing 
                                                 
28 McCrystal, above n 21, 199. 
29 See McCrystal, above n 21; Explanatory Memorandum, Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth) [269]. 
30 FWA s 19(1)(c). 
31 FWA s 19(1)(a). 
32 FWA s 19(1)(d). 
33 (2004) 133 IR 197. 
34 Ibid [44]. 
35 (2008) 175 IR 243. 
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had become available and such testing was less invasive of the employees’ 
privacy and should be implemented. The employer stood down certain 
employees for their refusal to take random urine tests and the union sought 
orders from the AIRC to stop what the union argued was unprotected 
industrial action, in the form of a lockout of employees by the employer. The 
AIRC refused to make the order because the stand down was not ‘industrial 
action’ within the meaning of the WRA — in its context, the action of the 
employer lacked the necessary industrial character to meet the definition in 
the Act. 
The definition excludes action by employees that is authorised or agreed to by 
the employer and action by an employee that is based on a reasonable concern 
by the employee about an imminent risk to his or her health and safety.36 
C The Fair Work Act Provisions in Overview 
The current provisions appear in Division 9 of Part 3-3 of the FWA. They are 
very detailed and have been labelled a ‘complicated set of rules’.37 On one 
view, they ‘betoken an almost obsessive desire to ensure that employees do 
not receive payment in respect of periods during which they engage in 
(protected or unprotected) industrial action’.38  
Section 470(1) provides that ‘if an employee engaged, or engages, in 
protected industrial action against an employer on a day, the employer must 
not make a payment to an employee in relation to the total duration of the 
industrial action on that day’. This general rule does not apply to a partial 
work ban or an overtime ban, which are subject to separate provisions.39  
In the case of unprotected action, section 474 provides that no payment must 
be made for the entire period of the action. For unprotected action that runs 
for less than four hours, a minimum deduction of four hours’ pay is required.  
Sections 473 and 475 provide that an employee must not accept a payment 
from an employer if the employer would contravene section 470 or 
section 474 by making the payment, nor must an employee ask the employer 
to make such a payment. A union or any officer or member of a union must 
                                                 
36 FWA s 19(2). The occupational health and safety exception applies only where the employee 
did not unreasonably fail to comply with a direction of his or her employer to perform other 
available work that was safe and appropriate for the employee to perform. 
37 McCrystal, above n 21, 197. 
38 Creighton and Stewart, above n 1, [22.77]. 
39 See FWA ss 471(3)–(4), 470(4), 474(2). 
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not ask an employer to make a payment to an employee if the employer would 
contravene these sections by making the payment.  
Sections 470(1), 473, 474(1) and 475 are all civil remedy provisions under 
Part 4-1 of the FWA. A contravention of any of these provisions gives rise to 
liability for a penalty under section 539 of the FWA. An employer, employee 
or a union may be prosecuted, and a successful prosecution exposes the 
defendant to a range of penalties, including fines of up to 60 penalty units 
($10 200) for an individual and or up to 300 penalty units ($51 000) for a 
union or an employer that operates in corporate form.40 Any pressure exerted 
by employees or their union on an employer to pay strike pay may also 
contravene section 348, which deals with behaviour that amounts to coercion. 
An employer may also refuse to make payments to employees where the 
industrial action is ‘employer response action’, that is, a lockout by the 
employer in response to industrial action taken by employees.41 Unlike the 
provisions applying to employee industrial action, there is no prohibition on 
payment where the employer locks out the employees, although it is hard to 
imagine a circumstance where an employer’s negotiating position would be 
advanced by paying locked out workers.  
Employers and unions cannot get around the strike pay provisions by 
providing for strike pay in an enterprise agreement. Under the FWA, the Fair 
Work Commission (‘FWC’) cannot approve an agreement that contains 
prohibited content. Such content includes any ‘unlawful terms’, defined to 
include a term that ‘is inconsistent with a provision of Part 3-3 (which deals 
with industrial action)’.42 By this rather roundabout mechanism, the FWA 
prohibits employers and employees from avoiding the strike pay provisions, 
even if they might, by agreement, wish to do so. 
D The Purpose of the Provisions 
No statement of legislative purpose accompanies Division 9 of Part 3-3 of the 
FWA or the equivalent provisions in Part VIIIA of the WRA. The object of the 
FWA itself is to ‘achieve productivity and fairness … underpinned by clear 
rules governing industrial action’,43 although this does not take us very far in 
discerning the specific object of section 470. 
                                                 
40 See FWA pt 4-1. Penalty units are set under s 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). One penalty 
unit is currently $170 for contraventions committed after 28 December 2012. 
41 FWA s 416. 
42 FWA ss 409(3), 194(e). 
43 FWA s 3(f).  
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Several judicial statements about the legislative purpose of the strike pay 
provisions show that judges have interpreted the provisions as aiming to do 
more than give effect to the ‘no work-no pay’ principle. Some judges have 
focused on stamping out the practice of taking further industrial action to 
coerce employers to pay in respect of an earlier strike. Such practices 
occurred in the past, and were particularly common in the building and 
construction industry.44 In Ponzio v B & P Caelli Constructions Pty Ltd, 
Lander J said (inter alia): 
The policy of the Act is that if an employee engages in industrial action then 
it must be at the employee’s own expense [and] … to discourage unions and 
their officers from making claims for a payment or engaging in or 
threatening to engage in or organising industrial action for the purpose of 
coercing the employer to make a payment to an employee during a period of 
industrial action. That section has as its added purpose a protection to the 
employer in the event that a union or its members engage in that further 
industrial action.45 
Another purpose that has been discerned is the general discouragement of 
industrial action. In Independent Education Union of Australia v Canonical 
Administrators, Ryan J stated: 
I consider that s 187AA in the context of Pt VIIIA of the WR Act evinces a 
policy that collective bargaining should occur in an environment where 
employer and employee are to appreciate and accept the detrimental 
consequences for themselves of industrial action used as part of the 
negotiating armoury.46 
In a similar vein, Gilmour J in Mammoet observed that the purpose of 
section 470(1) ‘was to encourage employers and employees to negotiate and 
resolve disputes by ensuring that each bears the costs of their industrial 
action’.47  
These varied views on purpose suggest that strike pay provisions may serve a 
variety of purposes. There is nonetheless room for debate about whether all of 
these purposes necessarily justify the highly prescriptive approach to the issue 
taken in Division 9 of Part 3-3: the imposition of penalties on unions, 
employees and employers, and the proscription on parties to enterprise 
agreements making their own rules about the strike pay issues.  
                                                 
44 See Creighton and Stewart, above n 1. 
45 (2007) 158 FCR 543, [83]. 
46 (1998) 87 FCR 49, 73–4 (‘IEUA case’). 
47 CFMEU v Mammoet (2012) 206 FCR 135, 142. 
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There are various issues concerning the scope and interpretation of the current 
provisions, in particular the meaning of ‘payments to an employee’ and the 
interpretation of the provisions governing payments where the industrial 
action consists of a partial work ban. These are addressed in the next section. 
IV THE SCOPE OF THE STRIKE PAY PROVISIONS 
A What is ‘Making a Payment to an Employee’ under 
Section 470? 
Although they have discerned a range of purposes in the strike pay provisions, 
the courts have generally agreed that the provisions prohibit the payment of 
wages during a strike. In the IEUA case, Ryan J said that the detrimental 
consequences for the employee were normally ‘loss of remuneration in 
respect of the period of the industrial action and for the employer they are the 
loss of production attendant on a lockout’.48 This is, of course, consistent with 
the common law no work-no pay principle and with the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Fair Work Bill,49 and is supported by a plain reading of 
section 470.  
What has been less clear until the recent decision of the High Court of 
Australia is whether the prohibition on ‘making a payment to an employee’ in 
section 470 and its predecessors in the WRA extends to payments other than 
the wages or salary that the employee would have earned had that employee 
worked during the period of the industrial action. Some courts have suggested 
that the prohibition might extend further than non-payment of wages. It has 
been said, for example, that the purpose of the provisions was to ensure ‘that 
employees are to bear the economic loss of their industrial action’,50 or that if 
an employee engages in industrial action then ‘it must be at the employee’s 
own expense’.51  
The issue of the reach of the prohibition on payments to employees in 
section 470 has been settled only very recently by the High Court in 
Mammoet. The decision justifies detailed consideration, given that it provides 
an important clarification of the reach of the provisions.  
                                                 
48 Mammoet (2013) 300 ALR 460, [58], quoting the IEUA case (1998) 87 FCR 49 (Ryan J).  
49 Explanatory Memorandum, Fair Work Bill 2008, [259]. 
50 O’Shea v Heinemann Electric Pty Ltd (2008) 172 FCR 475, 487. 
51 Ponzio v B & P Caelli Constructions Pty Ltd (2007) 158 FCR 543, [83]. 
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1 The Mammoet Litigation in the Federal Circuit Court 
and Federal Court 
The issue of the reach of section 470 of the FWA arose from the taking of 
protected industrial action by employees of Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd in 
pursuit of a new enterprise agreement governing their employment. The 
employees worked in gas production on the Burrup Peninsula, a remote area 
of Western Australia. Because of the remoteness of the region, the employees 
worked on a fly in/fly out basis. Under the enterprise agreement applying to 
their employment,52 the employees were provided with accommodation paid 
for by Mammoet whilst on site, or were entitled to an allowance if 
accommodation was not provided, given that their ‘work was at such a 
distance that they could not return to their usual place of residence each 
night’.53  
In April 2010, the CFMEU, as the employees’ bargaining agent, gave notice 
that the employees would take protected industrial action for a period of 28 
days from 28 April. Mammoet required the employees to vacate their 
accommodation for the duration of the strike, asserting that the provision of 
the accommodation at its expense constituted a ‘payment’ to the employees 
and was therefore prohibited by section 470.  
The union commenced litigation, claiming that the refusal to provide the 
accommodation was ‘adverse action’ taken because the employees were 
exercising a ‘workplace right’ (being the right to take protected industrial 
action in pursuit of a new enterprise agreement).54 Lucev FM rejected the 
union’s case, upholding a submission by Mammoet that there was no case to 
answer because the employer-provided accommodation was a ‘payment’ 
prohibited by section 470(1) and requiring the employees to vacate it could 
therefore not be adverse action. In making his ruling, Lucev FM accepted that 
the purpose of section 470 was to require employees to ‘bear the economic 
loss of their industrial action’, and that the continued provision by the 
employer of paid accommodation would defeat that purpose.55 The Federal 
Magistrate took the view that it was consistent with Parliament’s intention 
that the employees ‘should bear, not only the loss of remuneration for the 
                                                 
52 This agreement had expired and the parties were negotiating a new agreement. Under the 
FWA, an expired agreement continues to operate until replaced by a new agreement.  
53 This was the definition of ‘distance worker’ in cl 42 of the Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd Pluto 
Project Greenfields Agreement 2008. 
54 The workplace rights provisions are in FWA pt 3-1. The adverse action was the alteration of 
the employees’ position to their detriment because they had exercised a ‘workplace right’, 
being the right to take protected industrial action: see FWA ss 340–2.  
55 CFMEU v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd (2011) 254 FLR 59, [111]. 
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period of protected industrial action, but also the burden of all financial 
consequences of that action’.56  
The union appealed unsuccessfully to the Federal Court on the question of the 
meaning of ‘payment to an employee’ in section 470(1). Gilmour J took the 
view that the expression should not be interpreted narrowly and that if 
Parliament had intended section 470 to prohibit only the payment of wages, 
then ‘it could have employed that language or language to that effect’.57  
The decisions were handed down during the period of the government’s 
review of the first three years of operation of the FWA. Several submissions to 
the review expressed concern about the implications of the decisions in 
Mammoet and the need for amendment to section 470 to overturn the 
decision.58 The Review Panel was sympathetic to those submissions and 
wrote in its final report: 
The interpretation of the court potentially presents a problem for any 
employee engaging in protected industrial action where provision of 
accommodation forms part of their overall remuneration. It also presents a 
problem for all employers of those employees, as making payment for 
periods of industrial action in contravention of this requirement is a civil 
remedy provision. Accordingly, the interpretation of the court is likely to 
result in substantial disruptions to employees and employers, as the 
practical effect is to require an employer to cease providing accommodation 
to employees for the duration of protected industrial action.59 
The Report stated that the requirement to remove an employee from the 
accommodation as a consequence of that employee taking industrial action 
had a demonstrably harsh impact on employees in the Mammoet case. It 
agreed that the interpretation of section 470 undermined the capacity for 
employees, who live away from home in accommodation provided by their 
employer, to take protected industrial action. The Report recommended that 
section 470 be amended to make clear that ‘payment’ did not extend to the 
provision by employers of accommodation to employees working in remote 
areas.  
The recommendation was strongly supported by the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions (‘ACTU’), which was concerned that the outcome of the 
litigation ‘undermines the ability of thousands of employees engaged in 
                                                 
56 Mammoet (2013) 300 ALR 460, [30]. 
57 CFMEU v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd (2012) 206 FCR 135, [43]. 
58 Submissions were made by the ACTU, the CFMEU, the Electrical Trade Union and the 
Australian Workers Union. 
59 Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Review of the Fair Work Act (2012) 185. 
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remote areas to take protected industrial action by imposing a significant 
financial burden on workers’.60  
The recommendation was not taken up by the government in its amending 
Bill61 in response to the Review Panel’s report. However, the decisions in the 
Federal Circuit Court and the Federal Court were overturned by the High 
Court.  
B The High Court Decision 
On 12 April 2013, the High Court gave the CFMEU leave to appeal the 
Federal Court’s decision in Mammoet. In a unanimous judgment, the High 
Court allowed the appeal in its decision handed down on 14 August 2013. The 
focus of the decision was the meaning of section 470.  
The Court accepted that the purpose of section 470(1) is to allocate the 
economic loss attributable to industrial action as between employers and 
employees.62 The Court considered it ‘quite plain’, however, that ‘the 
provision does not comprehensively address the allocation of all the costs of 
[the] industrial action’.63 Nor does the provision ‘prohibit the performance of 
the entirety of the obligations of an employer to its employees for the duration 
of the industrial action’.64  
The enterprise agreement required the employer to provide accommodation at 
its expense to its employees that were ‘distance workers’ as defined by the 
agreement. The Court took the view that the provision of such 
accommodation may involve the transfer from the employer to the employee 
of an economic benefit. This benefit may be capable of being expressed in 
terms of monetary value, but that of itself did not mean there had been a 
‘payment’ by the employer to the employee of that sum.65  
The Court looked to other provisions of the FWA where the term ‘payment’ 
was used to ascertain the meaning of ‘payment’ in section 470 and concluded 
that when the FWA speaks of ‘payment’ it means payment of money.66 The 
true construction of section 470 was also to be ascertained by the nature of 
                                                 
60 ACTU, Response to Towards More Productive and Equitable Workplaces: An Evaluation of 
the Fair Work Legislation, 21 August 2012, 28. 
61 Fair Work Amendment Bill 2013 (Cth). 
62 Mammoet (2013) 300 ALR 460, [42]. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid [46]. 
66 Ibid [47]. 
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section 470 as a civil remedy provision. Like criminal penalties, a civil 
penalty ‘should be “certain and its reach ascertainable by those who are 
subject to it”’.67 This requirement of certainty would not be satisfied if an 
employer could be subject to a penalty not only by taking some positive 
action (paying wages to striking employees), but by doing no more than 
maintaining the status quo (such as permitting employees to continue to use 
accommodation paid for by the employer). The Court pointed also to the 
legislative history of the strike pay provisions to show that it is the non-
performance of work by the employee that is the occasion of the proscribed 
payment.68  
Having observed that the FWA in fact contemplates the continued subsistence 
of the employment relationship during and after industrial action,69 the Court 
turned to consider the means by which the employees came to receive the 
accommodation at the work site. The benefit of the accommodation was 
established by the enterprise agreement binding the parties. On a plain 
reading, the accommodation was a benefit to which the employees were 
entitled upon attending at the work site, unless and until they were directed to 
return to their usual place of residence. The provision of the accommodation 
was therefore ‘neither a payment of money, nor provided in relation to the 
non-performance of work during the period of industrial action’.70  
Finally, the Court considered an allied argument that because the employees 
were not ready, willing and able to work, they were not entitled to the 
provision of accommodation for the period when no work was performed. The 
Court impliedly rejected the application of this common law principle and 
focused instead on the terms of the enterprise agreement as defining when the 
entitlement to accommodation arose. The Court reasoned that: 
The effect of the Agreement is that, while the employment relationship 
subsists, accommodation is to be provided by the respondent to its 
employees who have acted upon its instruction to travel to the location of 
the Project. It is the continuation of the employment relationship and the 
employee’s entitlements under it which is the condition on which the 
provision of accommodation depends.71 
                                                 
67 Ibid [48], citing with approval DPP (Cth) v Keating (2013) 87 ALJR 657, [48]. See also 
Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1985) 6 FCR 1, 47–8. 
68 Mammoet (2013) 300 ALR 460 [52]–[59]. 
69 Ibid [59]. 
70 Ibid [61]. 
71 Ibid [72]. 
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Finally, the High Court made it clear that, in the light of the meaning of 
section 470, the denial of accommodation to the employees in all the 
circumstances would constitute adverse action under section 342 of the FWA: 
[T]he respondent’s denial of accommodation would be an alteration of the 
position of the relevant employees to their prejudice so as to constitute 
adverse action within the meaning of s 342 of the Act. Even though the 
refusal of accommodation would … not be a denial of a legally enforceable 
entitlement, it would effect a deterioration in the advantage enjoyed by the 
relevant employees had the refusal of accommodation not occurred.72 
For all these reasons, the High Court allowed the appeal by the CFMEU and 
remitted the matter to the Federal Circuit Court to be heard and determined 
according to law.  
The decision gives welcome clarification of the scope of the prohibition in 
section 470 and has important implications for employees wishing to exercise 
their right to engage in protected industrial action. Employees must forgo their 
wages, but are not required to forgo other non-wage benefits under their 
contracts or enterprise agreements. Thus, such employees are not to be made 
to suffer additional economic loss that may have the practical effect of 
discouraging them from exercising an important industrial right.  
C Payments for Partial Work Bans under Division 9 
As discussed in Part III, the strike pay provisions apply not only to situations 
involving a complete stoppage of work, but also to partial work bans. 
Section 471(3) defines a partial work ban as industrial action that is not a 
failure or refusal by an employee to attend for work, or a failure or refusal by 
an employee who attends for work to perform any work at all, but excludes a 
ban on overtime, which is subject to its own provisions. In the case of a partial 
work ban that is protected industrial action, section 471 allows the employer 
to elect to pay nothing, or to pay a proportion of the employees’ wages, 
provided that the employer gives written notice in advance of what it intends 
to do.73 These provisions reflect the common law principles on part 
performance and reflect the employer’s right to demand performance of all 
duties before any wages are paid. The right is, however, subject to the 
                                                 
72 Ibid [73]. Section 342(1) of the FWA defines ‘adverse action’ to include action that ‘alters the 
position of the employee to the employee’s prejudice’. In its earlier decision in Patrick 
Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (No 3) (1998) 195 CLR 1, 
[4], the Court made it clear that these words were not confined to the alteration of a legal 
right. 
73 FWA s 471(4). 
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employer giving formal written notice of the intention not to pay. The 
provisions are an innovation introduced by the FWA, the purpose of which is 
to provide employers with flexibility and discretion in managing partial work 
bans that constitute protected action.74  
Under section 471, the employer is required to give notice to employees in 
advance of an intention not to pay at all, or stating what proportion of the 
employees’ wages will be paid; otherwise full payment must be made. The 
regulations prescribe requirements relating to the form of notice given and the 
content of such notice.75 The employer is taken to have given notice to the 
employee in accordance with that paragraph if the employer has taken all 
reasonable steps to ensure that the employee, and the employee’s bargaining 
representative (if any), receives the notice and has complied with any 
requirements prescribed by the regulations. Where the legislative requirement 
to give notice relates to substantive rights, the federal tribunal has generally 
required substantial compliance with the notice provisions.76   
1 Determining Part Payment 
Although under section 471(4) the employer may pay nothing during a partial 
work ban, an employer may consider it politic to pay some wages, not least 
because a failure to pay at all may prompt a full strike.77 The payment for a 
partial work ban is worked out according to the regulations, which require a 
three-step process: first, the employer must determine the ‘work’ that is the 
subject of the ban; next, the employer needs to calculate the proportion of 
time the employee would have spent on performing that work; and finally the 
employer reduces the employee’s total pay by that proportion.78 The amount 
to be deducted is not intended to represent damages suffered by a business, 
but to relate to the proportion of the employee’s work not performed, 
calculated according to his or her normal wages.79  
This proportion of total wages that the employer elects to pay may be 
challenged by employees in the FWC, which has the power on application to 
make an order substituting its own calculation for the employer’s.80 In doing 
                                                 
74 Explanatory Memorandum, Fair Work Bill 2009 (Cth) [301]. 
75 Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) regs 3.22–3.24. 
76 See, eg, Capricornia Pty Ltd t/a Quality Hotel Batman’s Hill on Collins [2011] FWA 727. 
77 The option of a full strike must have been included on the ballot paper when the union 
balloted its members about their preparedness to take protected industrial action as part of the 
bargaining for a new enterprise agreement. 
78 Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) reg 3.21. 
79 Explanatory Memorandum, Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth) [309]. 
80 FWA s 472. 
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so, the FWC must take into account whether the proportion specified in the 
employer’s notice was reasonable having regard to the nature and extent of 
the partial work ban and to fairness between the parties, taking into 
consideration all the circumstances of the case.81  
Two recent cases on payment for partial work bans have exemplified the sorts 
of considerations that the FWC regards as relevant in determining part-
payment in the case of partial work bans. Clearly section 472 arms the 
Commission with the discretion to consider factors other than those that the 
employer is expressly required to consider under Regulation 3.21. This poses 
some difficulties for employers wishing to exercise their statutory right to pay 
only a proportion of wages because they clearly need to consider a wider 
range of factors than the proportion of total time that the banned work 
represents if they want their calculation of reduced wages to survive a 
potential challenge. 
In Transport Workers Union v Department of Territory and Municipal 
Services (ACTION),82 the ACTION bus company in the Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT) gave notice that it would dock bus drivers’ wages by two-
thirds in respect of a one-week work ban during which the drivers continued 
to drive the buses but refused to accept cash fares. The partial work ban was 
lifted whilst the drivers’ union challenged the notice.  
Commissioner Deegan considered that the ‘proper application’ of 
Regulation 3.21 required a careful consideration of what was ‘work’ for the 
purposes of the required calculation. She held that ‘work’ in this context is 
capable of meaning more than just the physical task that is banned and that the 
question of what ‘work’ is includes consideration of the overall impact of the 
banned task on the work.83 Whilst taking cash fares might occupy only a 
small amount of time during each shift, the impact of the ban went further 
than loss of cash fare revenue alone. She considered that a failure by the 
drivers to collect cash fares would result in a large proportion of passengers, 
who would normally use other ticketing methods, instead proffering cash, 
confident that it would not be accepted.84 A ban on the collection of fares 
would also impact on the entire community as ACTION was taxpayer-funded 
                                                 
81 FWA s 472(3). 
82 (2010) 197 IR 1. 
83 Ibid [34]. This interpretation is consistent with common law principles for determining part-
payment. 
84 Ibid [46]. 
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and the lost revenue was likely to result in an additional government subsidy 
being required.85  
Whilst acknowledging that fairness as between the parties was a difficult 
concept to apply in this context, Commissioner Deegan said that it was 
relevant to consider that the ban was designed to have maximum impact on 
the employer whilst having the least possible impact on drivers’ wages. It was 
also relevant to take into account (in the employees’ favour) that a bus service 
was still being provided and that the impact on revenue of non-collection of 
fares was not severe for the company, given that the service was heavily 
subsidised by government. The Commissioner calculated a pay deduction of 
20.1 per cent, being the percentage that fare collection contributed to the 
overall cost of providing the bus service. 
In AIMPE v Port of Brisbane Pty Ltd,86 the union challenged the reduction in 
pay by the Port of Brisbane for a partial ban on the maintenance of a dredging 
vessel. The employer’s reduction of the engineers’ pay of 35 per cent was 
calculated by reference to the maintenance activity on the vessel over the 
previous 12 months.87 The union argued that the reduction was unfair, given 
the actual work done during the industrial action.  
Commissioner Harrison accepted that the assessment of whether the 
proportionate reduction was reasonable — having regard to the nature and 
extent of the partial work ban — is an assessment which is undertaken 
prospectively at the time of issuing the notice rather than retrospectively after 
the partial work ban ceases.88 He considered that the holistic approach 
adopted by the employer (looking at an average over 12 months) was sensible 
in light of the evidence about the inherent lack of predictability regarding the 
nature and extent of the work that would have been required to be performed 
if not for the partial work ban during the industrial action period. Whilst he 
was willing to give consideration to the union’s reasons for disputing the 
employer’s calculations, the Commissioner concluded that the union had 
failed to provide sufficient evidence to satisfy him that he should disturb the 
35 per cent proportionate reduction assessed by the employer when the notice 
was given.89  
An interesting aspect of this decision was the Commissioner’s view that the 
fairness criterion in section 472(3)(b) supported a retrospective assessment of 
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the impact of the partial work ban. Under this criterion, Commissioner 
Harrison was influenced in his decision not to vary the employer’s deduction 
by the fact that it had incurred costs as a result of the TSHD Brisbane having 
to move from Hay Point to Cairns. The partial work ban was the reason for 
the dredge having to relocate as it did, and this was the direct cause of 
significant costs to the employer as it was required to pay compensation to 
North Queensland Bulk Ports.90  
With respect, this approach appears contrary to the intent of the provisions as 
set out in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Bill, which stated 
that the reduction in pay for a partial work ban is not intended to serve as 
damages for losses suffered by the employer (given that this is protected 
industrial action) but only to represent the wages value of the unperformed 
work. The issue may need to be resolved by a Full Bench at a future time. 
D Overtime Bans 
Overtime bans are not partial work bans for the purposes of Division 9 and 
have their own rules. Under sections 470(4) and 474(2), the requirement on 
the employer not to make payment applies only if the employee was 
specifically requested or required to work a period of overtime, the employee 
refused to work that period of overtime, and the refusal was a contravention of 
the employee’s obligations under a modern award, enterprise agreement, or 
the employee’s contract of employment.91  
These specific provisions were designed to address the situation that arose in 
O’Shea v Heinemann Electric Pty Ltd,92 a decision made under the provisions 
of the WRA, which did not make specific provision for overtime bans. A 
dispute had arisen about the employer’s obligation to pay in a case where a 
number of employees worked their normal day of 7.45 am to 4.30 pm, but 
refused to work overtime shifts that ran between 4.40 pm and 6.30 pm. The 
employer argued that the employees were engaged in one continuous period 
of industrial action from the first day of the overtime ban until the last day of 
that ban; the ban was clearly in place and was not lifted and re-applied on a 
daily basis and, for this reason, it constituted ongoing industrial action. 
Therefore, the employer was correct in withholding all payments whilst the 
industrial action was on foot. 
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91 For a fuller discussion, see McCrystal, above n 21, 203–5. 
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The Federal Court rejected the employer’s arguments, finding that industrial 
action is not necessarily considered a continuing period of industrial action if 
it is broken by a period of ordinary work. Accordingly, the industrial action 
occurred only for the duration of the overtime shift, being two hours each day. 
The employer could therefore refuse pay for those two hours.93 The court 
observed that ‘[i]n a case where the employees have contributed the benefit of 
a full day’s work to their employer, it seems contrary to the intention of the 
provision to punish employees beyond the calculation allowed for in the 
provision’.94 The provision was not meant to be punitive. 
V CONCLUSIONS 
The principle that employees who fail to work because they are engaged in 
industrial action should not be paid is far from new. The no work-no pay 
principle has long been a part of the common law of employment.  
The FWA provisions regulating strike pay have been largely uncontroversial, 
if submissions to the Fair Work Act Review are any indication. This can 
probably be explained by the advantages the current provisions have over the 
WRA provisions they replaced, particularly with respect to the abolition of the 
minimum four-hour pay deduction (for protected industrial action at least) and 
the treatment of pay for partial work bans. The common law rules on the 
payment of wages in circumstances of part performance have lacked clarity, 
and the WRA did not deal with this form of industrial action at all. The 
strength of the current provisions is that they recognise that employees who 
actually do some productive work can be paid something for that work and 
that employees are also entitled to know in advance by how much the 
employer proposes to reduce their pay. The requirement reflects a principle of 
fairness — that employers should pay for the labour from which they benefit. 
Employers must give notice in writing if they plan to refuse all payment in 
cases where not all duties are performed. On the ‘nuts and bolts’ issue of how 
much the employer determines should be paid there are few tribunal 
decisions. Those there are suggest that there is a mismatch between the 
method set out in the regulations for how employers are to calculate reduced 
payments made to employees engaged in partial work bans, and the 
considerations applied by the FWC should the employer’s pay notice be 
challenged. If considerations of fairness and the impact of the omitted work 
(rather than the proportion of time the duties take) are relevant, as the 
decisions suggest, it would be better specifically to require employers to turn 
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their minds to them when they make their calculations. It is also important 
that the Commission does not endorse the use of pay reductions as a de facto 
mechanism for compensating the employer for economic loss, as was hinted 
at in the Brisbane Ports decision. To do so has the potential to undermine the 
protection given by the FWA to lawful industrial action.  
As far as the scope of the prohibition on strike pay is concerned, the 
Mammoet decision in the High Court has brought welcome clarification to the 
question of what constitutes ‘payments to an employee’ in section 470(1). 
Payments are confined to the wages the employees would have earned during 
the period of industrial action and do not include accommodation to which an 
employee is entitled under his or her enterprise agreement. The principle 
established in the decision probably extends to the provision of other benefits 
that the employee is entitled to under the instruments that cover his or her 
employment. If the decision had been different, employees working away 
from home would have found themselves less able than other employees to 
exercise the rights under the FWA to take protected industrial action because 
of the serious financial implications for them of exercising those rights. The 
rights of employees to take protected industrial action are already heavily 
circumscribed; any further limits on such a right should not be able to be 
achieved indirectly via the strike pay provisions. 
It must be acknowledged, however, that there is some truth in the observation 
that the strike pay provisions of the FWA reflect an ‘almost obsessive desire’ 
to ensure that employees do not receive payment for those times in which they 
engage in industrial action, whether that action is protected or unprotected. 
This is reinforced by the provisions of the FWA that make it impossible to get 
an enterprise agreement approved by the FWC if it contains provisions that 
deal with strike pay, even if the parties have negotiated their own terms 
dealing with the issue.  
There may be a number of reasons for the extremely detailed regulation of 
this relatively straightforward issue. The detailed provisions on strike pay are 
a legacy of the Howard government’s workplace laws, which in many 
respects exemplified ‘command and control’ regulation, focusing on detailed 
government regulation of major facets of collective employment relationships, 
rather than letting the parties reach their own agreements on matters that 
affected them, underpinned by a floor of minimum rights and requirements.95 
It also reflects a preoccupation of the Howard government with curbing the 
power of the more militant unions in Australia, particularly those representing 
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building and construction workers. It was these unions that most often used 
industrial power to persuade employers to pay their members for time spent 
on strike. 
As Stewart has observed, the FWA retained many features of the WRA and 
indeed the Work Choices laws. The detailed strike pay provisions, albeit in an 
expanded form, are part of this retention. As Stewart points out, this can be 
explained by, amongst other things, a desire by the Rudd Labor government to 
placate business interests, distance itself from the union movement and also to 
retain a ‘balance’ in the FWA between the interests of business on the one 
hand and employees and their unions on the other.96 Now that a Coalition 
government is in power, it would seem unlikely that the prescriptive rules 
about strike pay will be relaxed, but at the same time there is no indication 
that the government is interested in overturning the interpretation given to 
‘payments to an employee’ in the Mammoet decision, which is favourable to 
employees. Those interested in the area will continue to watch the 
interpretation of the provisions by the courts and the FWC and wait to see if 
the forthcoming Productivity Review of the FWA has anything to say about 
these important provisions and other related facets of Australian workplace 
legislation. 
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